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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Nos. 46747-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

& 46826-2019

)

Jerome County Case N0.
CR-2015-1349 &

)

V.

)

Twin Falls County Case No.
CR42- 1 8-1 1461

)

THOMAS BUCK CHAPUT,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

M
Should Chaput’s appeal

1.

Case No. 46826 be dismissed because Chaput waived his right
to appeal all matters involving his sentence? Alternatively, has Chaput failed to show the
district court abused its discretion by refusing to retain jun'sdiction?

2.

Has Chaput

failed to

in

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Thomas Buck Chaput
pp.3—4.)

The

state

stole various items

charged Chaput with grand

from Walmart on three different occasions. (PSI,

theft.

(46826

R., pp.26—27.)

Chaput pled guilty

Under the terms 0f the plea agreement, Chaput

pursuant to a plea agreement. (46826 R., p.30.)
1

waived

.

.

m

issues in this case, including all matters involving

[unless] the Court exceeds the

.

p.3

his right to “appeal

1 .)

At sentencing, the

(1/29/2019

state

Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9.)

recommendation made by the

recommended

The

district court

state’s

.

.

the sentence

State at sentencing.” (46826 R.,

a uniﬁed sentence of ten years With

imposed the

.

recommended

ﬁve years ﬁxed.

sentence. (46826

R., p.39.)

In an unrelated case, the state sought to revoke Chaput’s probation because Chaput

committed

petit theft, failed to report to his probation ofﬁcer,

moved without telling his

ofﬁcer, failed t0 maintain employment, absconded, and failed to

74.)

that

Chaput admitted

to all

under Rule 35

district court

t0 reduce his sentence

ﬁve years ﬁxed instead of the longer
0n probation.1 (46747

R., pp.7 1 -

0f the Violations except the failure t0 report t0 his probation ofﬁcer

he had moved. (46747 R., p.90.) The

his request

pay restitution. (46747

probation

R., p.1

1

1.)

revoked Chaput’s probation but granted

and imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ten years with

original sentence the court suspended

The

district court

When Chaput was

ran the sentences concurrently.

put

(46826 R.,

p.38.)

Chaput moved
sentencing hearing.
(7/3 1/2019

t0 consolidate

both cases for appeal because the

(7/30/2019 Motion to Consolidate.)

Order Granting Motion

district court

held a joint

This Court granted Chaput’s motion.

t0 Consolidate.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision whether to
V. Jones,

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.

141 Idaho 673, 676-77, 115 P.3d 764, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2005).

a sentence

1

retain jurisdiction

is

E

State

When evaluating whether

excessive, the court considers the entire length 0f the sentence under an abuse 0f

Chaput was originally sentenced

ﬁxed. (PSI, p.8.)

in that case

0n the charge 0f aggravated

assault to ten years

discretion standard. State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State

1, 8,

146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

Similarly,

when

V. Stevens,

the district court orders the

execution of a suspended sentence, “[a] decision t0 refuse to reduce the sentence earlier

pronounced will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing

218 P.3d

discretion.” State V. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,

5,

that the trial court

abused

its

7 (Ct. App. 2009).

ARGUMENT
I.

Chaput Has Failed T0 Show That The

Court Abused

District

Its

Discretion

BV Refusing T0

Retain Jurisdiction

As

a preliminary matter, this Court should dismiss Chaput’s appeal in Case No. 46826

because he waived his right to appeal that sentence as part of his plea agreement. The waiver of
the right to appeal as a

voluntarily,

component of a plea agreement

knowingly and

intelligently.

Chaput signed a plea agreement
district court

district court

L.6).

in

State V.

imposed a greater sentence than the

The waiver thus remains

intact.

state

valid and will be enforced if it

was made

Mugphy, 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994).

Which he waived

imposed the exact sentence the

is

his right t0 appeal his sentence unless the

state

recommended (46826

recommended (1/29/2019

Not only has Chaput

R., p.31),

Tr., p.23,

failed t0 argue that his

and the

L.19 — p.24,

waiver was not

voluntary, knowing, 0r intelligent, he failed even to inform this Court 0f the waiver’s existence.

(E Appellant’s brief.)

This Court should thus dismiss Chaput’s appeal in Case N0. 46826.

In any event, the district court did not abuse

“There can be n0 abuse of discretion in a

trial

its

discretion

by refusing to

retain jurisdiction.

court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court

already has sufﬁcient information upon Which t0 conclude that the defendant
candidate for probation.”

m,

141 Idaho at 677, 115 P.3d at 768.

sufﬁcient information to conclude that Chaput

was not

The

is

not a suitable

district court

had

a suitable candidate for probation because

Chaput had just admitted

numerous probation

t0

(46747 R., p.90.)

Violations.

As

the state

explained at sentencing, Chaput committed grand theft “after he’s had the beneﬁt of community
supervision, [and] after he’s

Based 0n

p.7, Ls.19-24.)

retained jurisdiction

that information, the district court reasonably

would

Chaput argues

had the beneﬁt 0f the retained jurisdiction program.” (1/29/2019

[not]

do us any good.” (1/29/2019

that the district court should

T11, p.23,

Tr.,

found that “a subsequent
Ls.19-24.)

have retained jurisdiction because he would

have beneﬁtted from a new retained jurisdiction program focused on substance abuse.
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

opportunities

felony.”

.

.

.

But, as the district court observed, Chaput has already had “numerous

t0 get help”

and “[n]onetheless,

district court

doing

then [Chaput] committed a

that,

After ﬁnding that probation was “obviously” not

(1/29/2019 Tr., p.22, Ls.18-25.)

working, the

after

did not have t0 retain jurisdiction a second time. (1/29/2019 T11, p.23,

Ls.1-11 (observing that Chaput did not want to take advantage 0f the

given him and that the

district court

many

opportunities already

was “out of options”).)

II.

Chaput Has Failed T0 Show That The

The

district court

did not abuse

its

sentence

is

it.

Court Abused

sentencing discretion when

0f ten years With ﬁve years ﬁxed for grand
further reducing

District

theft

it

Its

Sentencing Discretion

imposed a uniﬁed sentence

and executing Chaput’s past sentence Without

This Court applies the well-established standards governing Whether a

excessive to a district court’s refusal t0 reduce a previously imposed sentence.

Hanington, 148 Idaho

at 27,

218 P.3d

at 7.

It is

presumed

that the

Will be the defendant’s probable term 0f

conﬁnement. State

P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

is

0f demonstrating that

it is

E

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

V. Oliver,

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse 0f discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

8,

368 P.3d

at

628

(citations omitted).

To

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

A

sentence

facts.

it

The

Li.

differing weights

is

excessive under

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

retribution.

the sentence

Li.

reasonable if

is

show

district court

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

all

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

when deciding upon the

sentence.

I_d.

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

at 9,

368 P.3d

district court

at

629; State V. Moore, 131

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the obj ectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting

ﬁxed within
discretion

m,

146 Idaho

the limits prescribed

by

the trial court.”

Li

at

by

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

its

8,

View 0f

368 P.3d

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute Will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

Chaput concedes

d0 not exceed the statutory maximum.” (Appellant’s

Thus, as Chaput acknowledges, he “‘must show that the sentence, in light of the

brief, p.3.)

governing

that his “sentences

criteria, is

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.

999

(quoting State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002)).)
In fashioning Chaput’s sentence, the district court recognized that

(Appellant’s brief, p.3

He
it

cannot do

so.

should “consider[] the

four goals 0f sentencing: protection of society, rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence;
recognizing, however, that protection 0f society

Ls. 1 -5.)

The

district court

ﬁles and noted that

its

noted that

it

is

the primary concern.”

(1/29/2019

Tr., p.22,

had reviewed the presentence investigation report and case

“overriding observation”

was

“the lack 0f accountability”

0n Chaput’s

part.

(1/29/2019 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-17.) The district court found, based on Chaput’s criminal history and
refusal to change his behavior, that allowing Chaput out into the community “puts society at risk.”
(1/29/2019 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.) The district court also acknowledged that Chaput had already
unsuccessfully been placed on a rider and found that “a subsequent retained jurisdiction would
[not] do us any good.” (1/29/2019 Tr., p.23, Ls.19-24.) Because the district court properly
considered and weighed the relevant factors, it did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
Chaput erroneously argues that the district court should have given lesser sentences
“[c]onsidering that Mr. Chaput’s criminal behavior stemmed directly with [sic] his substance abuse
addiction, and that he acknowledged his issues and wanted treatment.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The district court considered Chaput’s history of substance abuse but concluded that Chaput
needed the sentences imposed because he had refused to take accountability for his actions despite
the many opportunities offered to him:
The overriding observation I have in this case is the lack of accountability.
There has been numerous opportunities, Mr. Chaput, for you to get help and take
advantage of opportunities. You’ve had, you know, a couple of opportunities on
probation. If I recall, in the Jerome County case, there was a motion to revoke and
the State withdrew it and let you proceed on probation. Nonetheless, after doing
that, then you committed a felony.
Since being on probation you had the DUI. You’ve got a pending theft, and you’ve
had the grand theft. So obviously probation isn’t working. And just letting you out
puts society at risk.
And, you know, the Court can give you all kinds of opportunities, but if you don’t
want to take advantage of them or use them as an opportunity to change, the Court
is out of options. I feel at this stage that based on your conduct while out on
probation and after having had the opportunity of a rider that the Court is out of
options.
(1/29/2019 Tr., p.22, L.15 – p.23, L.11.) Given Chaput’s failure to take advantage of the many
opportunities provided him, Chaput’s substance abuse problem did not require the district court to

6

impose a

lesser sentence for grand theft 0r to further reduce his original sentence in

Case N0.

46747.

CONCLUSION
The
afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests this

district court’s

DATED this

judgment

in

Court dismiss Chaput’s appeal in Case No. 46826 and

Case N0. 46747.

17th day of September, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

correct

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the

that

I

have

this 17th

day of September, 2019, served a true and
to the attorney listed below by means of

foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

iCourt File and Serve:

JUSTIN M. CURTIS

DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

